Working Papers Abstracts
We illustrate how a constraint on a receiver’s actions impedes information trans- mission from multiple senders. The uninformed receiver wants to match an action to a multidimensional state. Each sender observes only one dimension of the state space and cares only about matching the action in that dimension. The receiver has the same preference with each expert in the specific dimension, but confronts a budget constraint that determines feasible actions. This constraint causes a conflict of interest between the senders and the receiver leading to incentive to exaggerate the state. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and analyze the welfare of the senders and the receiver according to the constraint.
“Substitutive Delegation”
This article analyzes a principal’s optimal delegation to two agents under a constraint on feasible decisions. The constraint causes interim biases, potential conflict of interest between the principal and agents, even if they have common preferences. These biases make the principal put a limit on each agent’s discretion. Given a budget constraint, specific form of the constraint, the principal balances the limits as if they are substitutive goods.
Publication
“Effect of credit guarantee policy on survival and performance of SMEs in Republic of Korea”, Small Business Economics (31), 2008, 445-462, joint with Almas Heshmati & G.G.Choi